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FUTURE INFLATION:
A NEW ELEMENT OF DAMAGES IN WISCONSIN
"The rule of damages must give true expression to the realities of life." - Benjamin N. Cardozo.I
Inflation is an economic reality which has consistently
plagued the economy since the mid-1950's. Although there
have been some infrequent declines in consumer prices in the
last four decades, there has not been a major decline since the
Great Depression. 2 In the past thirty years inflation has been
perhaps the single most persistent problem facing the federal
government. Each new presidential administration has unsuccessfully attempted to combat spiraling prices.' Furthermore,
inflation is not likely to subside in the near future.'
Despite impressive evidence of both past and continuing
inflation, courts have only recently begun to consider inflation
as a proper element in computing future damages. However,
lump sum awards of future damages based on loss of earning
capacity and future medical expenses have created a compelling need to consider inflation. Our legal system strives to compensate a plaintiff for future losses by awarding a fixed sum of
money now. This common law principle of single recovery has
few exceptions. 5 Although the possibility of replacing lump
sum recoveries with a system of periodic payments has been
suggested, most such proposals have been rejected because of
their expensive and burdensome ramifications.' Consequently,
1. Broadway Photoplay Co. v. World Film Corp., 225 N.Y. 104, 108, 121 N.E. 756,
757 (1919).
2. S. SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH -

ECONOMIC HANDBOOK § 6:3, at 92

(1970).
3. See Stein, FiscalPolicy: Reflections on the Past Decade, in CoNTEMPoRARY EcoNOMIC PROBLEMS 55 (W. Fellner ed. 1976).
4. See UNITED STATES COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS, THE ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE

PRESIDENT 1978, at 76, 80-82, 141-45 (1978); Why the Odds are Against Inflation
Fighters, Bus. WEEK, June 5, 1978, at 83-85; Econometric Forecast, WHARTON
MAGAZINE, Spring 1978, at 50.
5. See Fleming, Damages in Accident Cases, in DAMAGES IN PERSONAL INJURY AND
WRONGFUL DEATH CASES 21 (S. Shreiber ed. 1965).
6. See generally Frankel v. United States, 321 F. Supp. 1331, 1341 (E.D. Pa. 1970),
aff'd sub nom. Frankel v. Heym, 466 F.2d 1226 (3d Cir. 1972); 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES,
THE LAW OF TORTS § 25.11, at 1326 (2d ed. 1956); R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
THE LAW 79 (1973) [hereinafter cited as POSNER]; Comment, A Misuse of Statistics
and Future Damages, 51 NEB. L. REv. 663, 673-74 (1972); 2 OKLA. L. REV. 224, 226
(1949). Despite the inherent problems, systems of periodic payments have not been
totally rejected. Structured settlements, consisting of periodic payments, are often
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the lump sum payment will undoubtedly remain the basis of
the damage award system, and along with it, the need for judicial consideration of inflation.
A court's initial determination of whether inflation ought to
be an element in computing future damages involves three
fundamental policy concerns: (1) achieving just and accurate
compensation, (2) preventing speculative awards and (3) attaining simplified and efficient trial procedures.' Determining
the admissibility of inflation necessarily involves trade-offs
between these policy concerns since no solution successfully
satisfies all three criteria. As a result, courts have arrived at
differing solutions to the problems of inflation and future damages.
These solutions can be broadly categorized into three different approaches. Under the traditional approach, inflation is
not to be considered as an element of future damages and evidence of rising prices is not admissible in court.' Other courts
have adopted the so-called "middle-ground approach" which
allows the jury to consider inflation, but with little or no expert
testimony on the subject Another solution is simply to admit
any evidence of inflation. This third view, known as the
"economic evidence approach," seems to be representative of
the current legal trend."°
A simple example shows the effects of using an inflation
factor in calculating damages." Assuming that a decedent's
future work-life expectancy was twenty years and that his estimated annual salary was $20,000, the lump sum award for
future work loss before consideration of inflation, or the time
used. See Annuities to Settle Cases, 42 INs. CouNsEL J. 367 (1975); T. Evans,

Structured Settlements - A Useful Tool in CatastrophicInjury Cases, 33 Mo. B.J.
419 (1977). The N.C.C.U.S.L. is drafting a Uniform Periodic Payments Act which, as
presently proposed, is intended "to eliminate opinion evidence or predictions as to
economic fluctuations." National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, Uniform Periodic Payments Act 6 (January 13, 1978) (Special Committee Meeting Draft).
7. Freeport Sulphur Co. v. The S/S Hermosa, 526 F.2d 300, 311 (5th Cir. 1976)
(Wisdom, J., concurring).
8. See text accompanying notes 90-101 infra.
9. See text accompanying notes 102-105 infra.
10. See text accompanying notes 106-112 infra.
11. For the purposes of illustration, drastic simplifications will be made. For example, the awards in this hypothetical will not be reduced to account for personal consumption and expenditures. This example only purports to show the effect that inflation has on a damage award.
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value of money, would be $400,000.12 If a court failed to consider possible increases in earnings due to a worker's increased
productivity or inflation, a court might reditce the estimated
earnings per year by a discount rate to determine the present
value of the award. Use of a six percent discount factor would
yield a lump sum award of approximately $229,397.'1 However,
a court could allow for inflation by increasing each year's earnings by a projected rate of inflation such as four percent. 4
These inflation-adjusted earnings could then be reduced to
present value by use of the six percent discount rate. Under this
method the lump sum award would be $329,470.15 Thus, allowing for inflation in this instance, the award for future loss of
earnings is increased by more than $100,000.
Hypothetical Future Damage Computations'0

year
(1)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
Totals

earnings
(2)

discounted
earnings
(3)

inflation
adjusted
earnings
(4)

discounted
inflated
earnings
(5)

earnings
reduced
by inflated
discount
rate
(6)

$20,000
20,000
20,000
20,000
20,000
20,000
20,000
20,000
20,000
20,000
20,000
20,000
20,000
20,000
20,000
20,000
20,000
20,000
20,000
20,000

$18,868
17,800
16,792
15,842
14,945
14,099
13,301
12,548
11,838
11,168
10,536
9,939
9,377
8,846
8,345
7,873
7,427
7,007
6,610
6,236

$20,800
21,632
22,497
23,397
24,333
25,306
26,319
27,371
28,466
29,605
30,789
32,021
33,301
34,634
36,019
37,460
38,958
40,516
42,137
43,822

$19,623
19,252
18,889
18,533
18,183
17,840
17,504
17,173
16,849
16,531
16,219
15,913
15,613
15,319
15,029
14,746
14,468
14,195
13,927
13,664

$19,608
19,224
18,846
18,477
18,i15
17,759
17,411
17,070
16,735
16,407
16,085
15,770
15,461
15,158
14,860
14,569
14,283
14,003
13,729
13,459

$400,000

$229,397

$619,383

$329,470

$327,029

12. See column (2) of chart in text accompanying note 16 infra.
13. See column (3) of chart in text accompanying note 16 infra. The six percent
discount factor is a figure assumed by the author for the purposes of illustration.
14. See column (4) of chart in text accompanying note 16 infra. The four percent
inflation rate is a figure assumed by the author for the purposes of illustration.
15. See column (5) of chart in text accompanying note 16 infra.
16. All calculations are rounded approximations.
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A different method of allowing for inflation of the damage
calculation has been followed by several courts.'7 Under this
approach, a real discount rate is determined by subtracting the
estimated inflation rate from the discount rate. Using the figures given above for these rates, the real discount rate would
be six percent minus four percent, or two percent. Applying
this factor to the estimated earnings of the decedent, the future
loss value is $327,029, or approximately $2,500 less than that
determined under the more commonly used approach. 8 Use of
this minority approach has been criticized by some writers.'"
I. DAMAGE AWARDS IN WISCONSIN

Damages are defined as the compensation awarded to an
injured party by the law.2" In Wisconsin, tort damages are
based on the theory of compensation. These "compensatory
damages are given to make whole the damage or injury suffered by the injured party."21 Although damages are not allowed when based only on speculation and conjecture,12
"plaintiffs are not required to ascertain their damages with
mathematical precision, but rather the trier of fact must set
damages at a reasonable amount." Evidence offered by the
plaintiff need only reasonably support the various components
of the award. "There is no requirement that.

. .

each item of

damages awarded must bear the same mathematical ratio to
the evidence."
These fundamental principles must be considered in any
discussion of the rules relating to the admissibility of expert
testimony on the inflation issue and the propriety of even including inflation as an element of future damages. Expert testimony is generally admissible on any issue which requires special knowledge, skill or experience in areas which are not within
the realm of the ordinary experience of mankind.2 Such testi17. See, e.g., Feldman v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 524 F.2d 384, 387 (2d Cir. 1975).
18. See column (6) of chart in text accompanying note 16 supra.
19. See PosNE R, supra note 6, at 83 n.4.
20. J. GHIADI, PERSONAL INJURY DAMAGES IN WISCONSIN

§ 1.01 (1964) [hereinafter
cited as GSAnm].
21. White v. Benkowski, 37 Wis. 2d 285, 290, 155 N.W.2d 74, 77 (1967).
22. Dickson v. Pritchard, 111 Wis. 310, 312, 87 N.W. 292, 293 (1901).
23. White v. Benkowski, 37 Wis. 2d 285, 289, 155 N.W.2d 74, 76 (1967).
24. Rupp v. Travelers Indem. Co., 17 Wis. 2d 16, 25, 115 N.W.2d 612, 617 (1962).
25. In re Bowler Trust, 56 Wis. 2d 171, 184, 201 N.W.2d 573, 579 (1972); Pollock v.
Pollock, 273 Wis. 233, 246, 77 N.W.2d 485, 492 (1956); Wis. STAT. § 907.02 (1975).
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mony is not proper if the trier of fact is able and competent to
draw its own conclusions."8 Although inflation is a fact of life
which is within the ordinary experience of all jurors, the probability of its future existence and its effect upon the adequacy
of damages are not. The resolution of these issues requires mastery of a complex set of variables. Expert testimony offered to
assist the jury in making the appropriate mathematical calculations would be a material aid in "the jury's search for
truth."2
In Wisconsin experts may give opinions based on undisputed facts or facts within their first-hand knowledge.2 Additionally, expert witnesses may state opinions based on assumed
facts.2 9 Thus, it appears that expert testimony on future inflation and its effects on the adequacy of future damage awards
is admissible under Wisconsin law. Such opinions are based, in
large part, on past inflationary trends, which are undisputed
or at least within an expert's personal knowledge. However, an
equally valid argument might be made that opinions of the
future based on past economic history would be too speculative
due to the unpredictability of economic conditions.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has certainly not been blind
to past inflation. The court has consistently recognized its
relevance to damage awards in other contexts. The "past inflation" issue has arisen, for example, in cases where the defendant appealed claiming that the damage award was excessive
in comparison to prior awards in earlier suits involving similar
circumstances." In these cases the Wisconsin court has
adopted the majority view,3" recognizing that because of intervening inflation such past awards do not provide a relevant
basis for comparison. 2 The Wisconsin court has also taken past
26. Casson v. Schoenfield, 166 Wis. 401, 415, 166 N.W. 23, 27-28 (1918).
27. McCrossen v. Nekoosa Edwards Paper Co., 59 Wis. 2d 245, 265, 208 N.W.2d
148, 159 (1973).
28. Milbauer v. Transport Employes' Mut. Benefit Soc'y, 56 Wis. 2d 860, 866, 203
N.W.2d 135, 139 (1973); Rabata v. Dohner, 45 Wis. 2d 111, 122, 172 N.W.2d 409, 414
(1969).
29. Milbauer v. Transport Employes' Mut. Benefit Soc'y, 56 Wis. 2d 860, 866, 203
N.W.2d 135, 139 (1973).
30. See Annot., 12 A.L.R.2d 611 (1950).
31. See United States v. English, 521 F.2d 63, 72-73 (9th Cir. 1975), and cases cited
therein.
32. See Crye v. Mueller, 7 Wis. 2d 182, 190-91, 96 N.W.2d 520, 525 (1959). Cf.
Rebholz v. Wettengel, 211 Wis. 285, 291-92, 248 N.W. 109, 111 (1933). Rebholz is
interesting in that it was decided in 1933. Therefore, the subject was deflation rather
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inflation into account in situations where the trial court had
allowed the jury to consider only the economic conditions existing at the time of the verdict. 3 InDabareinerv. Weisflog the
court approved a jury instruction that: "In determining money
value of damages, you are entitled to consider the present depleted value of a dollar and its lessened purchasing power."',
This willingness of the Wisconsin court to consider past inflation, however, does not necessarily require speculation or expert testimony. Past changes in the price level are matters of
common knowledge and are matters of public record.
The Wisconsin court has allowed future economic considerations to enter into the damage calculation by permitting the
use of discount factors to reduce awards to present value. 5 The
use of a discount factor evidences a recognition of the fact that
a present lump sum award for an amount to be paid in the
future overcompensates a plaintiff in one sense because it implicitly includes interest on the award from the date of payment until the time in the future when the loss is realized. In
1916, the United States Supreme Court recognized that a "sum
of money in hand is worth more than the like sum. . payable
in the future," and held that a lump sum award of future
damages must be discounted to its present value. 7 Similarly,
early decisions of the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that a
lump sum award must be reduced to its present value."
At the present time, if counsel makes a timely request," the
jury will be instructed to reduce an award of future damages
to present value."0 The proper discount rate to be applied is a
than inflation. The defendant apparently requested that the court instruct the jury to
direct their attention to the present, greatly increased purchasing power of the dollar.
The court held that such failure to instruct was not prejudicial since "because of the
general economic distress," the present greater purchasing power of the dollar was a
matter of common knowledge. Id. at 292, 248 N.W. at 111.
33. See, e.g., Bethke v. Duwe, 256 Wis. 378, 385, 41 N.W.2d 277, 280 (1950);
Dabareiner v. Weisflog, 253 Wis. 23, 29, 33 N.W.2d 220, 223 (1948); Zeinemann v.
Gasser, 251 Wis. 238, 247, 29 N.W.2d 49, 54 (1947).
34. 253 Wis. 23, 29, 33 N.W.2d 220, 223 (1948).
35. See text accompanying notes 123-125 infra.
36. PosNER, supra note 6, at 79.
37. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Kelly, 241 U.S. 485, 489-91 (1916).
38. See, e.g., Maloney v. Wisconsin Power, Light & Heat Co., 180 Wis. 546, 54849, 193 N.W. 399, 400 (1923).

39. Failure to so instruct is not prejudicial error unless the instruction has been
requested. Bourassa v. Gateway Erectors, Inc., 54 Wis. 2d 176, 186, 194 N.W.2d 602,
607 (1972); Walker v. Baker, 13 Wis. 2d 637, 650, 109 N.W.2d 499, 506 (1961).

40. Wis. J.I. - CiWm No. 1796:
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question of fact to be determined by the jury. In Miller v.
Tainter, ' the Wisconsin court held that the trial court's failure
to properly instruct the jury on the choice of a discount rate
constituted prejudicial error. The court also suggested that
42
expert testimony on the subject might be appropriate.
The selection of a proper discount rate necessarily involves
a great deal of speculation.43 However, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court has not overlooked this fact. In McCrossen v. Nekoosa
Edwards Paper Co., it was noted that:
This court has recognized this problem [speculation] inherent in determining the present value of future losses and has
weighed the inability of a court or anyone else to predict the
future with certainty against the considered policy conclusion
that the ends of justice will be furthered by recognizing the
probabilities in respect to the computation of future damages."

By allowing this degree of speculation and the use of expert
testimony in the area of discounting awards, the Wisconsin
court has apparently elevated the policy of just compensation
well above considerations of award accuracy and trial efficiency.
In McCrossen, the court considered the type of evidence
required of an expert to establish underlying assumptions
which serve as the basis for the expert's economic predictions.
In an offer of proof made at trial, the plaintiff's attorney asked
an actuarial expert what the plaintiffs loss of future earnings
would be assuming a five percent discount rate and a four
percent wage increase every six months. A similar hypothetical
In determining the amount of any award to be made, you are instructed that
a sum allowed at this time to compensate for a loss or an expense which will be
incurred in the future must be reduced by you to its present value.
By "present value" is meant such sum which if invested at this time at the
current rate of interest, will produce in principal and interest the amount necessary to fairly and reasonably compensate the injured party for such loss or
expense, if any, as you find he will sustain at a particular time or times in the
future.
41. 252 Wis. 266, 31 N.W.2d 531 (1948).
42. Id. at 268-69, 31 N.W.2d at 533.
43. S. SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DATH § 8.9 (1966) [hereinafter cited as
SPEISER]; Note, Future Inflation and the Undercompensated Plaintiff,4Loy. Cm. L.J.
359, 366 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Undercompensated Plaintiff]; 37 OHIo ST. L.J.
138, 152 (1976).
44. 59 Wis. 2d 245, 261-62, 208 N.W.2d 148, 157-58 (1973); see also Reinke v.
Woltjen, 32 Wis. 2d 653, 660, 146 N.W.2d 493, 497 (1966).
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question was asked assuming the same discount rate and no
future wage increases. Although the witness answered both
questions, the trial court refused to permit the jury to hear the
expert's answers. 5
On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court was
correct because the hypothetical questions were based on assumptions not clearly established by the evidence. The supreme court rejected this argument:
[C]ontrary to the defendant's assertion on this appeal, it is
not objectionable that the evidence supporting assumptions
on which a hypothetical question is based is in dispute. Having established in the evidence some basis for the assumptions, they may be utilized in formulating a hypothetical
question to an expert. Whether the jury believes the underlying assumptions is within its fact-finding functions ...
[T]he assumptions upon which the hypothetical questions
were based were in evidence, and the defendant on this appeal does not argue that they are incorrect.46
Granting that the expert's testimony was speculative, the supreme court noted that the defendant's appeal probed "the
basic problem implicit in any attempt to predict the future
with certainty.

' 47 The

court pointed out that:

Wisconsin cases have recognized that, in order to show the
impairment of future earning capacity, a plaintiff must be
permitted to introduce evidence that is more speculative and
uncertain than would be acceptable for proof of historical
facts. . . . [Tihe court recognizes that certainty is an unattainable standard to predict future losses and that, to do
justice, calculations based on facts at hand and upon reasonable probabilities satisfy the rule."
The McCrossen court also discussed the admissibility of the
evidence concerning future wage increases. Although many
things are responsible for wage increases, inflation is certainly
one of the principal factors. The expert in McCrossen was
asked to assume an eight percent annual increase in wages. The
supreme court noted that considerable past experience supports the assumption that wages will increase in the future.
45.
46.
47.
48.

59 Wis. 2d at 260, 208 N.W.2d at 157.
Id. at 260-61, 208 N.W.2d at 157.
Id. at 261, 208 N.W.2d at 157.
Id. at 262-63, 208 N.W.2d at 158.
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Still, it found that the factor itself was "based but tenuously
on past experience," and held that the trial court's refusal to
admit the answer to the hypothetical question into evidence
was not an abuse of discretion.4 9 However, the court then
opened the door for admission of such evidence in future trials:
"On the other hand, given the evidentiary foundation of an
uninterrupted series of wage increases and the recent economic
history of the industry, we would not upset the trial judge's
exercise of discretion were he to have permitted the question
and its answer."50 Thus, the court indicated that evidence of
future inflation is admissible so long as the calculations were
based on facts at hand and reasonable probabilities.
H. Cords v. Anderson
On November 14, 1977, the Wisconsin Supreme Court carried the Mc Crossen rationale one step further when it held that
the failure to include future inflation in the damage computa51
tion was reversible error in the case of Cords v. Anderson.
Jane Cords was a member of a group that had spent a day
picnicking and hiking in Parfey's Glen, a state owned recreational area.5 2 After consuming her evening meal, Norina Boyle,
another member of the group, set out for an evening stroll along
a nearby trail. As darkness set in, Boyle accidentally strayed
from the narrow pathway and tumbled into a deep ravine. Jane
Cords and Sue Henry, another member of their party, attempted to rescue Boyle, but soon found themselves beside her
in the gorge sixty feet below.5" Cords was seriously and permanently injured as a result of her fall. 4
The three injured women brought suit against Floyd Anderson, the manager of the recreational area. In a trial to the court,
49. Id. at 264, 208 N.W.2d at 159.
50. Id.
51. 80 Wis. 2d 525, 259 N.W.2d 672 (1977). Although the decision has a considerable impact on the rescue doctrine and on the liability of public officials for damages
resulting from negligent performance of ministerial duties, discussion of the case will
deal strictly with the issue of inflation and future damages.
52. Id. at 531, 259 N.W.2d at 675.
53. Id. at 535, 259 N.W.2d at 677.
54. A physical education major, Ms. Cords, as a result of the fall, fractured her
wrist, suffered two ruptured lungs and injured her spinal cord which resulted in permanent paraplegia. Confined to a wheel chair for life, she later contracted phlebitis in
her left leg, a permanent condition of uncontrolled muscle cramps, loss of control over
her bowel and bladder and a susceptibility to bladder and skin problems. Id. at 553,
259 N.W.2d at 685.
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Jane Cords was found forty percent negligent in attempting the
descent"5 and was awarded $208,921.06 in damages. 6 Included
in this award was $45,284.00 for future medical expenses reduced to present value.17 According to the plaintiffs economic
expert, this figure represented her medical expenses, but only
if medical costs remained constant indefinitely into the future. 8 However, the parties had stipulated that medical costs
had risen an average of five percent per year during the seven
years preceding the trial. 9 The plaintiffs expert determined
that if that five percent rate of medical cost inflation continued
into the future, the present value of Jane Cords' medical expenses would be $104,988.0 The trial court refused to consider the
stipulated evidence concerning the effect of inflation on medical costs because of the "state of speculation of our economy"
and did not make any allowance for rising medical costs.6 '
The supreme court, in a four-to-three decision, reversed the
lower court's evidentiary ruling."2 Holding that the trial court's
refusal to take inflation into account was an abuse of discretion, the court remanded the case to the trial court to "consider
inflation as it seems reasonably probable in reaching a reasonable damage figure.""5
The Cords decision leaves several important questions unanswered. First, the court gave little guidance as to the type of
evidence which should be presented in cases involving future
inflation and future damages. Although the trial court was directed to consider inflation, the court stated that it was "not
. . . limited to mathematically applying a five percent annual
inflation rate indefinitely into the future to determine future
55. Id. at 561, 259 N.W.2d at 689 (dissenting opinion).
56. Id. at 537, 259 N.W.2d at 678.
57. Id. at 549 n.6, 259 N.W.2d at 683. The trial court found $2,917.77 as the amount
in medical and related expenses which were incurred by Jane Cords to the date of the
findings. Compensation for her injuries was found to be $300,000. The third figure
representing Jane Cords' damages was the $45,284.00 for future medical expenses
(sixty percent of the sum of these figures would represent the judgment, $208,921.06).
58. Id. at 549, 259 N.W.2d at 683.
59. Id. at 551, 259 N.W.2d at 684. The evidence was based on the medical care
component of the Consumer Price Index which had risen 37.7% from 1967 through
1973. Id. at 530, 259 N.W.2d at 674.
60. Id. at 549-50, 259 N.W.2d at 683.
61. Id. at 552, 259 N.W.2d at 684.
62. Justice Connor T. Hansen wrote a strong dissent in which Justices Hanley and
Robert W. Hansen joined. The majority opinion was written by Justice Day.
63. Id. at 552, 259 N.W.2d at 684.
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damages."" One might infer that the court approved the testimony of the plaintiff's economist, which was based on changes
in the medical care component of the Consumer Price Index
over a seven year span preceding the trial. It is more likely,
however, that the court simply did not find it necessary to
consider the type of evidence relevant to the inflation issue
because the nature of the evidence was not in issue: only its
admissibility was disputed." The court did note, however, that
such awards are "to some degree speculative" 6 and that "the
plaintiffs are not required to ascertain their damages with
mathematical precision." 7
Some courts have dealt directly with the question of what
types of evidence are admissible on the issue of inflation in
future damages. Several courts have given their approval to
statistics based on figures drawn from the Consumer Price
Index, such as those presented at the Cords trial. 8 Other
courts, however, have found that evidence of price rises over a
short and highly inflationary period are insufficient for projecting inflation over a relatively long period of time.69
A second question left unanswered by the Cords decision is
whether inflation should be considered by the trier of fact in
determining future damages other than medical expenses. The
court's holding could be narrowly interpreted to apply only to
calculations of future medical expenses, 70 but such a reading
seems inappropriate. While there have been some cases involv64. Id.
65. See United States v. English, 521 F.2d 63, 75-76 (9th Cir. 1975), where the
Ninth Circuit after allowing the trier of fact to consider inflation, cautiously warned
that any such estimates must be "based on sound and substantial economic evidence,
and as can be postulated with some reliability." See also Tenore v. Nu Car Carriers,
Inc., 67 N.J. 466, 481-84, 341 A.2d 613, 621-23 (1975), where the New Jersey Supreme
Court discussed the impropriety of evidence in the form of tables purporting to show
plaintiff's aggregate damages.
66. 80 Wis. 2d at 551, 259 N.W.2d at 684.
67. Id., quoting White v. Benkowski, 37 Wis. 2d 285, 289, 155 N.W.2d 74, 76 (1967).
68. See, e.g., Steckler v. United States, 549 F.2d 1372, 1378 (10th Cir. 1977); Hunt
v. State, 252 N.W.2d 715 (Iowa 1977).
69. See Hoffman v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 485 F.2d 132, 144 (3d Cir. 1973) (finding
use of a five year period in the late 1960's as a basis for a 26 year projection to be
without support of any evidence); see also Magill v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 464
F.2d 294, 300 (3d Cir. 1972); Frankel v. United States, 321 F. Supp. 1331 (E.D. Pa.
1970), aff'd sub nom. Frankel v. Heym, 466 F.2d 1226 (3d Cir. 1972).
70. In Cords the court declared, "However, inflation may be taken into account by
the fact finder as a separate factor to arrive at an amount that will fairly compensate
the victim for required future medical expenses." 80 Wis. 2d at 551-52, 259 N.W.2d at
684 (emphasis added).
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ing future medical expenses,7' the majority of the cases which
have considered the inflated future damages question have involved compensation for diminished earning capacity." The
Wisconsin court in Cords recognized that the policy of awarding adequate compensation required that evidence of inflationary trends be admitted on the medical expense question, even
though it was "to some degree speculative. 7 3 The same rationale should apply to all questions of future economic damage.
The dissent raised what was perhaps the most perplexing
question left open by the Cords decision. The dissenting justices noted that, although other jurisdictions allow the trier of
fact to assume that inflation will persist, they were aware of no
decision requiring such an assumption.74 Generally the future
inflation issue arises when a trial court rules on the admissibility of expert testimony and evidence concerning future inflation. In Cords, however, the trial court admitted such testimony, but refused to make an allowance for inflation because
it concluded that it was too speculative. The supreme court
remanded the case, advising the lower court that it "should"
consider inflation. Was the trial court required to recalculate
the future damage award to allow for future inflation or was it
merely to reconsider the award in light of the supreme court's
75
remand?
United States v. English" is perhaps the case most often
cited for the proposition that the trier of fact may consider
71. See, e.g., Hysell v. Iowa Pub. Serv. Co., 559 F.2d 468 (8th Cir. 1977) (nursing
care); Morrow v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 541 F.2d 713 (8th Cir. 1976) (nursing home
care and physical therapy); Frankel v. United States, 321 F. Supp. 1331 (E.D. Pa.
1970), aff'd sub nom. Frankel v. Heym, 466 F.2d 1226 (3d Cir. 1972) (mental institutional care); Niles v. City of San Rafael, 42 Cal. App. 3d 230, 116 Cal. Rptr. 733 (1974)
(physician's services, laboratory tests, x-rays, attendant care); Schnebly v. Baker, 217
N.W.2d 708 (Iowa 1974) (medical care).
72. Comment, Future Inflation, ProspectiveDamages, and the Circuit Courts, 63
VA. L. REv. 105, 107 (1977) [hereinafter cited as ProspectiveDamages]. See Crosby,
Impact of Inflation and Income Taxes on Future Damages in PersonalInjury and
Death Cases, 21 TmL LAw. GuinD 196 (1977).
73. 80 Wis. 2d at 551, 259 N.W.2d at 684. See also GHUI,
supra note 20, at § 1.01.
74. 80 Wis. 2d at 564, 259 N.W.2d at 690.
75. The recent case digest of the Wisconsin Bar Bulletin interprets the holding in
perhaps the most reasonable way: "Adopting the recent trend to allow, but not require
the fact finder to consider inflation when awarding future damages, the court finds
abuse of discretion and, hence, directs on remand consideration should be given to the
inflation factor, as it seems reasonably probable in reaching a reasonable damage
figure." WISBAR supreme court digest, Wis. B. BULL., Dec. 1977, at 25, 28-29.
76. 521 F.2d 63 (9th Cir. 1975).
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future inflation in awarding future damages. In that case, the
Ninth Circuit held, much like the Cords court, that the trier
of fact "may" take inflation into account in fixing damages.7"
The Tenth Circuit adopted the English rationale in Steckler v.
United States.78 As in Cords, the trial court in Steckler allowed
an expert to testify on the effect of inflation on plaintiffs damages, but rejected the contention that the award should be
increased to allow for the anticipated inflation. 79 The court of
appeals remanded, directing that "[o]n remand the court
should then determine from the evidence a reasonable annual
percentage figure for the purpose of accounting for probable
wage inflation.""0 Despite the concern of the Cords dissent,
Steckler is at least one opinion that seems to hold that failure
to actually allow for inflation in computing future damages is
reversible error. Clearly, there should be no question that expert testimony is admissible on the issue of future inflation in
Wisconsin. However, still to be authoritatively determined is
the question of whether the trier of fact, when supplied with the
economic evidence, is bound to use it in determining damages.
Arguably, the Cords decision provides an affirmative answer.
I1.

FUTURE INFLATION IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS

The nation's highest court has not definitively decided the
question of whether inflation should be an element of future
damages. In fact, the Court has denied certiorari in several
cases which involved the issue in some respect."1 The Supreme
Court has, however, adopted a general policy of allowing a
limited degree of speculation and conjecture in the factual determination of damages:
77. Id. at 74.
78. 549 F.2d 1372, 1378 (10th Cir. 1977).
79. Id. at 1376.
80. Id. at 1378.
81. See, e.g., Johnson v. Penrod Drilling Co., 510 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 839 (1975); Blue v. Western Ry. of Ala., 469 F.2d 487 (5th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 410 U.S. 956 (1973); Yodice v. Koninkilijke Nederlandsche Stoom. Maat.,
443 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 933 (1973); In re United States Steel
Corp., 436 F.2d 1256 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 987 (1971), reh. denied,
403 U.S. 940 (1971); McWeeney v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 282 F.2d 34 (2d Cir.
1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 870 (1960); Gowdy v. United States, 271 F. Supp. 733
(W.D. Mich. 1967), rev'd on othergrounds, 412 F.2d 525 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 960 (1969). But see Rediker v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R., 571 P.2d 70 (Kan. App.
1977), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3586 (1978). Rediker involves the issue of the propriety of income tax as a factor to be considered by a jury in awarding damages.

1978]

COMMENTS

It is no answer to say that the jury's verdict involved speculation and conjecture. Whenever facts are in dispute or the
evidence is such that fairminded men may draw different
inferences, a measure of speculation and conjecture is required on the part of those whose duty it is to settle the
dispute by choosing what seems to them to be the most reasonable inference. Only when there is a complete absence of
probative facts to support the conclusion reached does a reversible error appear . . . . [Tihe jury is free to discard or
disbelieve whatever facts are inconsistent with its conclusion."
In a 1968 decision, Grunenthal v. Long Island Railroad,3
the Court, in dicta, appeared to suggest that future wage increases should be considered in computing future damages.
The case could be interpreted to stand for the proposition that
expert testimony is admissible on the issue of future wage increases as well as inflation and productivity or merit increases.
In Grunenthal, the Court upheld the trial court's award of
$150,000 in a federal employer's liability action. The trial judge
noted that the award was supported by convincing testimony
concerning recent and. steady wage increases."4 However, wage
increases may be due to either inflation or an increase in productivity, and the reported decision does not indicate which of
these two causes was used as a basis for prediction. Furthermore, if the Court wished to recognize inflation as an acceptable element of future damages, it probably would have specifically expressed such a viewpoint.
Perhaps the only decision in which the Supreme Court dealt
directly with the issue of how changes in the economy should
affect future damage awards is a 1916 decision, Chesapeake &
Ohio Railway v. Kelly."5 The Kelly Court recognized the time
value of money and required that lump sum awards for future
damages be reduced to present value.8 6 In 1969 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals decided that the Kelly decision required
reduction of future damages to present value and that it would
be error to fail to do so on the grounds that inflationary trends
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645, 653 (1946).
393 U.S. 156 (1968).
Id. at 160.
241 U.S. 485 (1916).
Id. at 491.
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offset the need for such a reduction. 8 Such inflexible reliance
on the 1916 Kelly decision has been criticized.8 1 On the other
hand, some commentators question the practice of using inflation figures as an offset to regular discounting in light of the
explicit mandate of Kelly.89 Hopefully, the disagreements and
confusion among courts and commentators will cause the Court
to re-evaluate Kelly and possibly add an element of uniformity
to damage awards in the United States.
The most recent case advancing the traditional view that
inflation should not be considered in awarding future damages
is Johnson v. Penrod Drilling Co."° In Johnson, a personal injury action brought under the Jones Act, the Fifth Circuit took
judicial notice of the nation's inflationary economy and the
likelihood that inflation will continue in the future. Still, the
court refused to allow for future inflation because of its speculative nature." Despite the fact that the Fifth Circuit has reaffirmed the Johnson holding in subsequent decisions applying
federal law,"2 most states within that circuit allow future inflation as an element of damages. 3
Two other circuits have followed the traditional approach
while applying state substantive law. Unable to find any Rhode
Island precedent on the issue of inflation, the First Circuit, in
Williams v. United States, 4 held that evidence of future inflation is too speculative to be admissible.' 5 However, after
Williams, Rhode Island amended its wrongful death statute to
permit evidence of future inflationary trends. Bound by state
87. Sleeman v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 414 F.2d 305, 307 (6th Cir. 1969).
88. See Henderson, Some Recent Decisions on Damages: With Special Reference
to Questions of Inflation and Income Taxes, 40 INs. COUNSEL J. 423, 431 (1973);
UndercompensatedPlaintiff, supra note 43, at 367.
89. See Comment, Inflation and Future Loss of Earnings, 27 BAYLOR L. Rxv. 281,
285 n.24 (1975); Prospective Damages, supra note 72, at 112.
90. 510 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1975). See also 7 ST. MARY'S L.J. 432 (1975).
91. 510 F.2d at 236.
92. See Davis v. Hill Eng'r Inc., 549 F.2d 314, 332 (5th Cir. 1977); Higginbotham
v. Mobil Oil Corp., 545 F.2d 422, 434-35 (5th Cir. 1977). But see Weakley v. Fischbach
& Moore, Inc., 515 F.2d 1260, 1266-67 (5th Cir. 1975); Bryan v. John Bean Div. of FMC
Corp., 566 F.2d 541, 555 (5th Cir. 1978) (both cases applying Texas law in approving
of consideration of future inflation).
93. See Seaboard Coast Line R.R. v. Garrison, 336 So. 2d 423, 424-25 (Fla. Ct. App.
1976); Loetzerich v. Texas P.-M.P. Terminal R.R., 325 So. 2d 626, 629 (La. Ct. App.
1976); Halliburton Co. v. Olivas, 517 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. Ct. App. 1974).
94. 435 F.2d 804 (1st Cir. 1970).
95. Id. at 807.
96. Presently codified at R.I. GEN. LAws § 10-7-1.1 (1977).
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law, the First Circuit has since applied the amended statute to
allow inflation evidence in a trial.97
The Third Circuit has addressed the issue on three occasions.98 Although all three cases involved Pennsylvania substantive law, the decisions were made without reference to any
state decisional law on the issue. The cases appear to support
the traditional view because evidence of future inflation was
held inadmissible. However, language in each case indicates
that the court might have held differently if the inflation had
a sufficient foundation.
The holdings in Magill v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.99 and
in Hoffman v. Sterling Drug, Inc."I were based on the fact that
there was no evidence offered at either trial concerning economic trends. The Hoffman court considered a future earnings
award based on an estimated annual six percent wage increase
to be speculative because there was no evidence introduced to
support such a projection. The court noted that "Hoffman's
counsel [had] isolated a five-year period in the late 1960's, one
of the more inflationary periods in our history, and used it as
the basis for a projection of over 26 years without introducing
any evidence to support such a projection."'' 1 Thus, although
the Third Circuit appears to follow the traditional view, it
seems likely that it would allow such future inflation evidence
if offered with a substantial factual basis.
Some courts have wavered from the traditional view and
have adopted a "middle-ground approach," best represented
by the Sixth Circuit's decision in Bach v. Penn Central Transportation Co. 02 The Bach precedent has also been followed in
the Eighth Circuit. 0 3 In Bach, an economist was prepared to
testify that, based on his estimate of future inflation, the decedent, who was earning $13,496 per year at the time of his death,
97. See Turcotte v. Ford Motor Co., 494 F.2d 173 (lst Cir. 1974).
98. Hoffman v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 485 F.2d 132 (3d Cir. 1973); Frankel v. Heym,
466 F.2d 1226 (3d Cir. 1972); Magill v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 464 F.2d 294 (3d Cir.
1972).
99. 464 F.2d 294 (3d Cir. 1972).
100. 485 F.2d 132 (3d Cir. 1972).
101. Id. at 144.
102. 502 F.2d 1117 (6th Cir. 1974).
103. Johnson v. Serra, 521 F.2d 1289 (8th Cir. 1975); Riha v. Jasper Blackburn
Corp., 516 F.2d 840 (8th Cir. 1975). But cf. Hysell v. Iowa Pub. Serv. Co., 559 F.2d
468 (8th Cir. 1977) (allowing evidence and applying Iowa substantive law); Morrow v.
Greyhound Lines, Inc., 541 F.2d 713 (8th Cir. 1976) (applying Missouri law and allowing evidence because of failure to properly object).
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would have an annual income of $49,413 by his retirement in
the year 2002, approximately thirty years after his death. The
trial court had refused to allow the expert's testimony." 4 On
appeal, the court acknowledged the inability of economists to
forecast inflation with certainty and held that such testimony
was speculative and inadmissible. However, the court further
stated that:
Even though no expert testimony on inflation and future
increases was admitted, it was still error for the district court
to charge the jury that it should not consider future increases
or decreases in the purchasing power of money . . . . Inflation is a fact of life within the common experience of all
jurors. Admittedly, if the jury considers this issue without
expert testimony, their calculations will be even more imprecise. There is always a chance that the verdict may be too
generous. But if jurors should be prohibited from applying
their common knowledge of inflation in reaching a verdict,
the party entitled to recovery could be grievously undercompensated.1'0
Thus, under the middle-ground approach economic testimony
regarding future inflation is inadmissible, but the jury may,
given proper instructions, consider the effects of inflation in
awarding future damages.
Finally, several courts have adopted the "economic evidence approach" and have allowed expert economic evidence
and considerations of future inflation in computing future
damages. Although some earlier Second Circuit decisions seem
to follow the traditional view, ' "' two recent cases in that circuit
have allowed extensive expert economic testimony on inflation.'0 7 Although bound by Connecticut law in Perry v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc.,1'1 the court did not appear to base its
decision on state precedent when it affirmed the lower court's
decision to admit expert economic testimony.'0 '
104. 502 F.2d at 1122.
105. Id. (citations omitted).
106. Yodice v. Koninkilijke Nederlandsche Stoom. Maat., 443 F.2d 76 (2d Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 933 (1973); McWeeney v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 282
F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 870 (1960).
107. See Feldman v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 524 F.2d 384 (2d Cir. 1975); Perry v.
Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 489 F.2d 1349 (2d Cir. 1974). It should be noted that both the
majority and concurring opinions in Feldman were careful to point out that they were
not creating a federal rule. 524 F.2d at 387, 393.
108. 489 F.2d 1349 (2d Cir. 1974).
109. Id. at 1353.
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The Ninth Circuit enthusiastically adopted the "economic
evidence approach" in United States v. English' ° and
Burlington Northern, Inc. v. Boxberger.'" After stating compelling policy reasons in favor of awarding an accurate amount,
the English court emphasized the need for such expert testimony:
Nor do we intend to have our holding of today read as authorizing the court to arbitrarily draw an estimate of inflation out
of thin air. As with any other element of damages, we must
require the estimate of future inflation to be supported by
competent evidence. . . . By our holding we allow the trier
of fact in awarding damages to take into account only such
estimates of future changes in the purchasing power of money
evidence,
as are based on sound and substantial economic
2
and as can be postulated with some reliability.1
IV. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
The ideal damage award should accurately compensate the
plaintiff without undue reliance on speculative, confusing or
inaccurate expert testimony. Such testimony can often be expensive and time consuming. Of course, an award, which is to
justly compensate an injured party, must necessarily consider
the impact of future inflation. However, no perfect method has
yet been devised by the courts to give proper consideration to
the effect of future economic changes. Courts must arrive at a
solution to the problem by balancing the relevant policy considerations.
If expert economic testimony is admitted and the trier of
fact is allowed to consider the effect of inflation, the policy of
just compensation is furthered, but it is done at the expense of
two other policies. This approach does not prevent speculation
in the damage calculation and may serve to further complicate
trial procedures. One trial judge who refused to consider inflation of institutional care expenses offered this pertinent analysis:
The projected inflationary trend is speculation. Plaintiff has
used the decade of the 1960's, one of the more inflationary
times in the history of our country, as the basis for a projec110. 521 F.2d 63 (9th Cir. 1975). The Tenth Circuit adopted the English approach
in Steckler v. United States, 549 F.2d 1372 (10th Cir. 1977).
111. 529 F.2d 284 (9th Cir. 1975).
112. 521 F.2d at 75-76.
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tion of over fifty years. It is common knowledge that our
Government is and has been attempting to control inflation
Economists differ on their predictions. Moreover,
....
plaintiff will have money that can be invested and if inflation
continues, the return on the money will be greater, and this
would have an offsetting effect."'
The speculation problem is aggravated by the fact that each
expert's choice of data can have a significant effect on the
projection. For example, in the last five years the average annual rise of the consumer price index was 6.9%. However, the
same statistic for the years of 1948 to 1977 is 3.2%.114 Thus, use
of data drawn from highly inflationary periods to project future
economic trends may produce a distorted prediction. Although
such projections have been rejected by many courts, this was
the method used in the Cords trial."'
The "plethora of uncertainties""' 6 involved with the use of
economic projections often leads to erroneous assumptions and
unrealistic results. In DeWeese v. United States1 '7 the trial
judge noted that, "Illustrative of the heights to which experts
can rise when turned loose with a pencil, a calculator, and a
set of financial tables are the figures this 'econometrist' came
' 8
up with under Projection 'B' using the 8% inflation rate." 1
The econometrist's prediction was based on an assumed inflation rate at eight percent and a discount rate of four percent.
Additionally, the expert guessed that the deceased commuter
copilot would have been hired by a commercial airline after five
years. Although the copilot was earning $7,680 per year at the
time of his death, the econometrist projected that he would
have been making $310,485 annually by the time he reached
sixty years of age. The lost earnings were estimated to be in
excess of 3.7 million dollars. The court noted that, had a more
realistic six percent discount rate been assumed, the annual
tax free income would have been $72,360.78.19 Stating that the
113. Frankel v. United States, 321 F. Supp. 1331, 1346 (E.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd sub
nom. Frankel v. Heym, 466 F.2d 1226 (3d Cir. 1972).
114. G. Meisel, Suggested Defense Tactics, The Economic Expert in Litigation (An
Update) 60 (Def. Research Inst. 1977).
115. See note 69 and accompanying text supra.
116. Feldman v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 524 F.2d 384, 392 (2d Cir. 1975) (Friendly,
J., concurring).
117. 419 F. Supp. 170 (D. Colo. 1976).
118. Id. at 176.
119. Id.
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economist's predictions were "totally unconvincing" and
"nothing but crystal ball gazing,"'' 0 the court held that such
testimony was inadmissible because "such flights of fancy by
an 'econometrist' were of no aid to a court.' 2' Naturally,
projections which include figures which are completely out of
line with past earnings of a deceased are not likely to impress
a court. Such evidence might only mislead the trier of fact and
frustrate the goal of just and accurate compensation if not
rationally based and carefully screened.
The failure of economists to agree on an appropriate projection is a further basis for argument against the admission of
such evidence. Expert estimates of future inflation rates have
ranged from two to nine percent in recent litigation.' 22 Estimates of the discount rate, which are also based on expert
testimony, have varied significantly in recent cases.'1 However, the choice of a discount rate is somewhat limited in Wisconsin by the civil jury instructions which suggest the use of
the "current rate of interest.' 21 4 Although the use of the current
interest rate can be justified economically,1'2 it still does not
determine exactly which rate should be used. However, it is a
guideline and it does provide a check against an expert who
might project an inaccurate or unrealistic discount rate. A similar jury instruction guiding the jury in its choice of an inflation
rate could also be adopted. Such an instruction could advise
the jury of the importance of choosing an appropriate past
120. Id. at 172.
121. Id. at 177.
122. See, e.g., Hysell v. Iowa Pub. Serv. Co., 559 F.2d 468, 474 (8th Cir. 1977)
(5.25%); Steckler v. United States, 549 F.2d 1372, 1376 (10th Cir. 1977) (9.5% wage
increase factor); Morrow v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 541 F.2d 713, 723 (8th Cir. 1976)
(3.1%); Menard v. Penrod Drilling Co., 538 F.2d 1084, 1089 (5th Cir. 1976) (2%);
Feldman v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 524 F.2d 384, 387 (2d Cir. 1975) (2.87%); Riha v.
Jasper Blackburn Corp., 516 F.2d 840, 842 (8th Cir. 1975) (4.4%).
123. See, e.g., Hysell v. Iowa Pub. Serv. Co., 559 F.2d 468,474 (8th Cir. 1977) (6%);
Steckler v. United States, 549 F.2d 1372, 1376 (10th Cir. 1977) (4%). See also Carlson,
Economic Analysis v. Courtroom Controversy:The Present Value of Future Earnings,
62 A.B.A.J. 628, 630 (1976) (suggesting a "middle ground" between 5% and 9%);
Kirby, The Economist and the Defense Lawyer, 17 FOR THE DEFENSE 49, 52 (1976)
(suggesting that 5% is too low). Lebrenz & Kreidle, The Present Value of Lost
Wages-Explanation and Application, 64 ILL. B.J. 424, 428 (1976) (suggesting 8.5%
discount rate).
124. WIs. J.I.-CrvL No. 1796. See note 40 supra.
125. See Fitzpatrick, A New Method of Appraisal of Economic Loss Caused by
Death or Disability: The Annual Risk of Death Method, 43 INS. CouNsEL J. 240, 250
(1976).
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period on which to base the projected inflation rate and inform
the jury of the information which may be used in making this
determination. The jury should also be instructed that it is not
bound by the expert's testimony. ' Such complex instructions
might add to the confusion of jurors, but they might also help
alleviate the confusion often created by complex and academic
expert testimony.
There are several other problems which arise when inflation
is made an element of future damage awards. It is possible that
some elements of future damages may not increase at the same
rate as the overall economy.12 Furthermore, to accurately account for the true effect of future inflation requires that a num12 8
ber of complex variables, such as progressive income taxes
and the effect of inflation on interest rates,12 1 must be considered.
A number of arguments have been offered against the use
of the "middle-ground" and "traditional" approaches. The
"middle-ground approach" is supported by only one relevant
policy consideration. Allowing consideration of inflation without any evidence on the issue authorizes "the court to arbitrarily draw an estimate of inflation out of thin air." ' Use of this
approach involves a danger of inequity and inconsistency since
different juries will invariably choose different rates of inflation. Thus, although this approach will produce a less complicated trial than the "economic evidence approach," the results
will be more speculative and less accurate.
The problem with the traditional approach is that it will
almost always undercompensate the plaintiff. The traditional
approach ignores inflation, which will most likely be a part of
126. See Perry v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 489 F.2d 1349, 1353 (2d Cir. 1974) (where
such an instruction was used).
127. See Feldman v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 524 F.2d 384, 392 (2d Cir. 1975)
(Friendly, J., concurring). The dissenting justices in Cords noted the possibility of a
national health insurance program. 80 Wis. 2d at 564, 259 N.W.2d at 690.
128. See McWeeney v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 282 F.2d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 1960),
cert. denied, 364 U.S. 870 (1960). See also Brin, Jr., Economic Projectionsin Determination of Damages: Inflation and Income Taxes, 24 FED'N. INs. COUNSEL Q. 14, 22
(1974). As to income taxes and damages in Wisconsin, see Behringer v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 6 Wis. 2d 595, 95 N.W.2d 249 (1959); Hardware Mut. Cas. Co. v.
Harry Crow & Son, Inc., 6 Wis. 2d 396, 94 N.W.2d 577 (1959); Wis. J.I.-CWIv
No.
1735.
129. See Fitzgerald, Economic Loss in Wrongful Death: Principles of Evaluation,
44 INs. COUNSEL J. 427, 432 (1977).
130. United States v. English, 521 F.2d 63, 75 (9th Cir. 1975).
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the economy for a considerable time in the future. To fail to
account for such an obvious element of damages is to be blind
to reality. The emphasis should be placed on properly controlling the hazards involved with the use of the inflation element
in order to achieve truly fair results.
V. THE ALASKAN APPROACH
In Beaulieu v. Elliot,'3 ' the Alaska Supreme Court adopted
an intriguing approach which eliminates many of the problems
encountered when future inflation is made an element of damages, but also creates several new problems. By refusing to
discount future damages in recognition of the offsetting effect
of inflation, the Alaskan approach instantly achieves two policy considerations. It diminishes the chances of undercompensating the plaintiff while totally eliminating the complex, and
often confusing, testimony of economic experts.
This approach has been rejected in several jurisdictions'32
and has been criticized by several commentators.l" Some of the
courts have rejected the approach because of the Supreme
Court's mandate that awards of future damages be discounted 134 or because of conflicting state statutes and precedent."'

However, the approach has been supported by some economists,'3 6 courts

37

and commentators.'13 Notwithstanding this

support, the Alaskan system seems crudely imprecise and indeed is contrary to both Supreme Court and state precedent
concerning discounting. Because most realistic estimates of
inflation are lower than supportable levels of interest rates, the
131. 434 P.2d 665 (Alaska 1967).
132. See, e.g., Davis v. Hill Eng'r, Inc., 549 F.2d 314, 331-32 (5th Cir. 1977); United
States v. English, 521 F.2d 63, 75 (9th Cir. 1975); Turcotte v. Ford Motor Co., 494 F.2d
173, 186-87 (1st Cir. 1974).
133. See Comment, Future Inflation as an Element of Damages in Alabama, 5
CUM.-SAM. L. REv. 72, 85 (1974); UndercompensatedPlaintiff,supra note 43, at 367.
134. See, e.g.., In re United States Steel Corp., 436 F.2d 1256, 1279-80 (6th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 987 (1971). See also text accompanying notes 87-89 supra.
135. Freeman v. Lanning Corp., 61 Mich. App. 527, 233 N.W.2d 68 (1975).
136. E.g., Carlson, Economic Analysis v. Courtroom Controversy: The Present
Value of Future Earnings, 62 A.B.A.J. 628, 630 (1976). See Henderson, Some Recent

Decisions on Damages: With Special Reference to Questions of Inflation and Income
Taxes, 40 INS. CouNsEL J. 423, 431 (1973) (discussing the "myth" of the earning power
of money).
137. E.g., Schnebly v. Baker, 217 N.W.2d 708, 726 (Iowa 1974).

138. E.g., Prospective Damages, supra note 72, at 125-30. This comment provides
an excellent and extensive analysis of Beaulieu.
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Alaskan approach may consistently overcompensate plaintiffs
in our present economy. To greatly simplify an accepted theory
of economics, the market rate of interest is based primarily on
two elements: the true or real rate of interest and the rate of
inflation.'39 To equate the market rate of interest with the rate
of inflation, as the Alaskan approach suggests, is to ignore the
real interest rate which has been estimated to be between three
and four percent. "' Therefore, any "rate of inflation applied to
future income must also be an element in the rate of discount." ' Thus, besides crudely and imprecisely equating two
independent economic factors, the system could consistently
4
overcompensate plaintiffs."
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Cords decision set down a new rule of damages in Wisconsin. Just compensation requires the admission of economic
evidence of future inflation and that it be considered in awarding future damages. The policy considerations for such an allowance were best expressed by the English court:
(1) While predicting future inflationary trends, or extrapolating from present ones, may be speculative, so are most
predictions courts make about future incomes, expenses
... .Since it is still more probable that there will in the
future be changes in the purchasing power of the dollar, it is
better to try as best we can to predict them rather than to
ignore them altogether. (2) Even in the short time since the
cases against considering inflation in making damage awards
have been decided, inflation has become a considerably more
important factor in our economic lives . . . .While the administrative convenience of ignoring inflation has some appeal when inflation rates are low, to ignore inflation when
rates are high is to ignore economic reality.'
What then are the alternatives and how will such a system be
effectively checked?
The Alaskan approach should not be adopted by the Wis139. PosNF, supra note 6, at 81.
140. Kirby, The Economist and the Defense Lawyer, 17 FOR THE DEFENSE 49, 52
(1976).
141. Id.
142. Note that in the simplified example offered in the text accompanying notes
11 through 18, supra, offsetting both elements would yield a $400,000 damage award
while considering both would yield a significantly smaller sum of $329,470.
143. United States v. English, 521 F.2d 63, 75 (9th Cir. 1975).
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consin court. Although such a system does lead to very predictable awards and more efficient trials, its techniques are imprecise and tend to overcompensate.
The checks will necessarily have to come from both the
bench and the defense bar. An alert and informed bench can
and certainly will play a significant role in preventing windfall
awards since "[t]he courts' role is to keep such extrapolations
within reasonable bounds and insure that they conform to the
evidence." '44 The capability to use the power of remittitur,"45
which gives an overcompensated plaintiff the option of a new
trial on damages or a reduced award, should be utilized when
necessary at the trial level. At both the trial and appellate
levels, careful analysis should be made of the size of the award
in relation to the adequacy of the evidence offered."' Thus, it
is imperative that judges insist that an economic expert's testimony is controlled, reasonable and not speculative or incredible.
The second check on abuses which may excessively inflate
future damage awards should come from the defense counsel
who, through effective cross-examination
(and possibly
through the defendant's own economic expert), must point out
any fallacies in the testimony of plaintiff's expert. ' An informed attorney can certainly aid the trier of fact in its appraisal of evidence which is open to a variety of interpretations.
In the final analysis, the ultimate check will necessarily
come from the jury itself. Effective use of jury instructions by
the court and of cross-examination and argument by defense
counsel will aid the jury in its appraisal of the effects of inflation on future damages. Although the use of future inflation as
an element of future damages will undoubtedly further burden
the jury in its deliberations, a general understanding of inflation hopefully will allow the jury to reasonably and rationally
evaluate the value of evidence of future inflation and the effect
it should have on the damage award.'4
W. TED ToRNEHL
144. Bach v. Penn Central Transp. Co., 502 F.2d 1117, 1122 (6th Cir. 1974).
145. Wis. STAT. § 805.15(6) (1975).
146. See Johnson v. Serra, 521 F.2d 1289 (8th Cir. 1975).
147. See The Economic Expert in Litigation (Def. Research Inst. 1971); The Economic Expert in Litigation (An Update) (Def. Research Inst. 1977).
148. See Spmsmi, supra note 43, at § 8.11.

